“Against Knowledge Closure”

“In this book Marc Alspector-Kelly addresses many central issues in epistemology, giving special attention to skepticism, but his main concern is to deny skeptics one of their favorite tools by arguing against the knowledge closure principle, which says roughly that “any agent who knows P and recognizes that P implies Q knows—or is in a position to know—Q” (1).

Alspector-Kelly begins by clarifying the principle he means to reject. His target is single-premise closure of knowledge under deductive inference, wherein some subject S recognizes that a single conclusion Q follows deductively from a single premise P, where “recognizing that P implies Q” is being “inherently disposed to believe Q if one believes P, and not-P if one believes not-Q” (10).”

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